Policy-makers use different decision-making strategies and base their decisions – more or less explicitly – on both expert knowledge and opinions in order to cope with the sheer complexity of societal challenges and the political environment. Most politicians rely to some extent on personal ideology in the implementation of public policies. Potential decision biases such as ‘repair service behavior’ – the human tendency to try fixing what appears to be most problematic at first – also influence decision-making. While ideology plays (...) a prominent role in politics, we know too little about its effect on political decision-making. Some researchers would argue that the use of ideology and repair service behavior facilitate the decision process, while others suggest that it adversely affects the ability to make objective decisions. Using a political microworld simulation that reproduces complex real-world problems, we investigate the effects of repair service behavior and personal ideology on performance in a dynamic decision-making task. Although repair service behavior was not associated with performance, the results suggest that personal ideology significantly impaired goal attainment. Despite clear instructions to be as objective as possible and think critically in completing the task, ideology was powerful enough to disrupt objective policy-making, as indicated by the deviation from optimal scores and the overall microworld task goal, i.e., to win votes and be re-elected by the end of the game. (shrink)

Emotions are a natural vector for acting together with others and are witnessed in human behaviour, perception and body functions. For this reason, studies of human-to-human interaction, such as multi-person motor synchronisation, are a perfect setting to disentangle the linkage of emotion with socio-motor interaction. And yet, the majority of joint action studies aiming at understanding the impact of emotions on multi-person performance resort to enacted emotions, the ones that are emulated based on the previous experience of such emotions, and (...) almost exclusively focus on dyadic interaction. In addition, tasks chosen to study emotion in joint action are frequently characterised by a reduced number of physical dimensions to gain experimental control and subsequent facilitation in data analysis. Therefore, it is not clear how naturalistically induced emotions diffuse in more ecological interactions with other people and how emotions affect the process of interpersonal synchronisation. Here, we show that positive and negative emotions differently alter spontaneous human synchronous behaviour during a multi-person improvisation task. The study involved 39 participants organised in triads who self-reported liking improvisational activities. The task involved producing improvisational movements with the right hand. Participants were emotionally induced by manipulated social feedback involving a personal ranking score. Three-dimensional spatio-temporal data and cardiac activity were extracted and transformed into oscillatory signals to compute behavioural and physiological synchrony. Our results demonstrate that individuals induced with positive emotions, as opposed to negative emotions or a neutral state, maintained behavioural synchrony with other group members for a longer period of time. These findings contribute to the emerging shift of neuroscience of emotion and affective sciences towards the environment of social significance where emotions appear the most—in interaction with others. Our study showcases a method of quantification of synchrony in an improvisational and interactive task based on a well-established Kuramoto model. (shrink)

Je voudrais d'abord remercier Kai Nielsen d'avoir bien voulu me communiquer, deux semaines avant cette rencontre, le texte de son exposé. Cela m'a donné le temps d'absorber le choc de sa critique, de préparer une réplique qui soit autre chose qu'une riposte et puisse contribuer à clarifier quelque peu le débat dans lequel nous sommes tous deux engagés.

Dans la théologie contemporaine, la notion d’hospitalité dépend, en premier lieu, de la réception que le thème, compris en sens divers, a connue dans la société et la culture (1. Polysémie, plasticité, tensions). Son actualité est due à une réalité géopolitique du début du xxi e siècle qui concerne Europe et Amérique du nord, à savoir la crise migratoire, en même temps qu’au flot de réflexions et de prises de position que cette crise a généré (2. Actualité politique). À propos (...) des migrations, on doit se demander si la théologie contemporaine apporte une réponse à la mesure des enjeux (3. Contribution théologique). Enfin il paraît utile d’indiquer deux réflexions originales ayant trait à l’hospitalité, dues à Jean-Yves Lacoste et Jean-Louis Chrétien, que la théologie contemporaine peut à bon droit regarder comme des promesses (4. Pierres d’attente). (shrink)

H. Baayen (désormais HB) a publié récemment, généralement en partenariat, de nombreux articles importants en statistique linguistique, sur la notion de productivité morphologique tout particulièrement [Baayen et al., 2000 ; Baayen & Schreuder, 2000] L'ouvrage de synthèse qu'il présente est une étude statistique approfondie des distributions des fréquences des mots. A travers ce sujet clairement affiché dans le titre mais à première vue rebattu, HB semble, au moins pour les distributions des m...

H. Baayen (désormais HB) a publié récemment, généralement en partenariat, de nombreux articles importants en statistique linguistique, sur la notion de productivité morphologique tout particulièrement [Baayen et al., 2000 ; Baayen & Schreuder, 2000] L'ouvrage de synthèse qu'il présente est une étude statistique approfondie des distributions des fréquences des mots. A travers ce sujet clairement affiché dans le titre mais à première vue rebattu, HB semble, au moins pour les distributions des m..

In 1991, Benoît Patar published a set of anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima. He argued that both works should be ascribed to John Buridan and, taken together, constitute the first of Buridan’s three series of lectures on De anima. Even though Patar’s proof of the authenticity of the commentaries has not been unanimously accepted, his attribution of the works to Buridan turned out to be persistent. This article examines the question of the authenticity of the two anonymous commentaries. It (...) argues that there is no conclusive reason to attribute the works to Buridan. The texts are closely related to works by Buridan, but they bear the same relation to commentaries written by Nicole Oresme. As a consequence, the works should be considered to be exactly what they are: anonymous commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, written in the same context and around the same time in which the commentaries by John Buridan and Nicole Oresme were also written. (shrink)

After a brief sketch of the state of Buridan studies, this review article examines the recent study, by Benoît Patar, of a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics that is generally attributed to Albert of Saxony, but which Patar believes to have been authored by John Buridan (the text is preserved in the manuscript Bruges, Stadsbibliotheek 477, fols. 60va–163vb, and was edited by Patar himself in 1999). Patar is utterly convinced that the Bruges Quaestiones represent Buridan’s prima lectura, that is, his first (...) course of lectures on the Physics, which preceded the two other redactions that are traditionally attributed to him. However, there is no textual evidence in support of this assumption, but only speculative circumstantial evidence. The article therefore rejects Patar’s thesis as highly problematic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:186 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY direction and made meaningful, whereas for Fichte they are the cognitively recognized goals of human activity. Nonetheless, I still find Lacroix' thoroughgoing teleological interpretation of Kant a bit bothersome, at points strained, although there is little doubt that teleology plays a large part in Kant's thought with respect to the realm of reason. Moreover, I'm not convinced that Kant's thought is as unified and (...) internally consistent as Lacroix would like to find it. In all fairness, however, it should be mentioned that he does not ignore the inconsistencies in Kant's thought. Lacroix' Kant interpretation certainly warrants serious consideration, for it has at least two outstanding features: It makes Kant's doctrine of the noumenal realm much more palatable than most other interpretations. Secondly, it goes a long way toward drawing out the full significance of Kant's comment, "I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowLedr in order to make room for jaith." And it is only by bringing out the significance of this statement that Kant's work can be shown to be primarily metaphysical in intention. Finally, the work's greatest virtue may be that it pulls the shroud of formalism off Kant's thought and shows it to possess a dynamic concern for living man, a concern that few, if any, have seen in it before. Incidentally, Lacroix' book is full of observations on the reception and interpretation of Kant's thought by various twentieth-century French philosophers, and these offer some nice insights into the different directions French thought is taking today. TED B. HUMPHREY Arizona State University Wordsworth--A Philosophical Approach. By Melvin Rader. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967. Pp. x -4-217.38s.) Wordsworth's poems have brought tears to many a rational mind, but Melvin Rsder manages to keep sane and sober while he expounds the poet's ideas in plain prose and interprets critically the wealth of feeling, imagination, metaphor and myth in which the ideas are clothed. This rendering of Wordsworth's mind is eloquent in its own way, sad performs a useful service to readers who are apt to miss the train of thought within the flow of poetry and of communion with the landscapes of the English Lakes. The analysis shows how, after an early enthusiasm for Locke's and Hartley's "chemistry" of experience, the poet expresses philosophically dimensions of human nature and experience that had been neglected by the more clinical models of "association~sm." Wordsworth's own statement reveals this aspect of his thinking: "Imagination...is that chemical faculty by which elements of the most different nature and distant origin are blended together into one harmonious and homogeneous whole" (p. 139). Here the words "different" and "d'tstant," as Racier points out, exclude the types of association by resemblance and contiguity that are basic to Locke and Hartley. The hberation of Coleridge, and the imaginative transcendence of Wordsworth from these limitations of rationalistic empiricism is a major theme of Rader's work. However, Ruder shows that much of Wordsworth's naturalism is traceable to Hartley's influence. Cudworth's "dynamic idealism" which pictured nature as alive and insisted on the power of ideas, was another major source. Shaftesbury's analysis of the emotional aspects of human nature which his tutor, John Locke, excluded from his Essay because they are not in "the understanding" was also an inspiration to Wordsworth. The definite conversion to transcendentalism was completed by the Kantian romanticists, who suggested to Coleridge that the categorical imperative could be transformed into an a pr/or/gospel. The subsequent divergence of Coleridge and Wordsworth is described in detail by Ruder, and reveals the fact that naturalism retained a stronger hold on Wordsworth than it did on Coleridge. Wordsworth did not follow Coleridge into his romantic spiritual nationalism, but developed a nature-mysticism and "animism" (to use Rader's term). Though this mysticism is not an articulate philosophy, Rader follows it with sympathy and under- BOOK REVIEWS 187 standing. He picks his way philosophicelly ~darough the many preludes, interludes and epilogues of the long, autobiographical poem, The Prelude. He succeeds in interpreting philosophically.Wordsworth's absorption in "the... (shrink)

Le présent article revient sur le dernier ouvrage de Thomas Piketty, Capital et idéologie (2019). Nous commençons par inscrire l’ouvrage dans l’argument développé par l’auteur dans ses précédents ouvrages, avant d’en souligner un certain nombre de limites. Nous questionnons d’abord la manière dont Piketty pense le capitalisme, avant d’en venir à sa théorie de l’idéologie. Enfin, nous tenterons de définir les contours et limites du projet de dépassement du capitalisme de Piketty, c’est-à-dire sa vision d’une société juste, d’un « socialisme (...) participatif », développée au dernier chapitre de l’ouvrage. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Maurice Blondel on the Practice of Supernatural ReligionAnne M. CarpenterIntroductionMaurice Blondel attended daily Mass to the very end of his life.1 This essay is, in a way, a meditation on this fact. But it is more nearly a confrontation with Blondel's philosophical argument in defense of human action's capacity for affirming the infinite, for "containing" the infinite in its affirmation of the infinite, an affirmation achieved in action's finitude. (...) That is, this is an essay on Blondel's argument for a supernatural religion that can be literally practiced. Much like Blondel's larger philosophical works, this essay spends its time exploring the coordinating ground of supernatural religion, which is the natural world split open in two directions: in its very existence, which is a supposition of what absolutely outstrips its power; in its very action, which in ecstasy takes the shape of a desire for a reversal that it cannot offer itself. So the natural world presupposes the supernatural and desires the supernatural while remaining, of its own power, natural. Blondel makes a theoretical distinction in the universe that, concretely, is a natural–supernatural one committed to a single destiny. This theory and this concreteness cohere in order to make the literal practice of religion both possible and necessary, terms that this essay explains. [End Page 1305]Action: The Problem of Theory and PracticeBlondel's later writing in the 1930s expands on an important paradox that appears in the very early L'Action (1893). That paradox has to do with a distinction between theory—that is, the world of ideas and reflection—and practice, by which Blondel means the concrete world of human action, a world that for Blondel is an expansive range or "body" of action. It is true, after all, that an idea is not a deed. And yet no deed is without its idea, without the mediatory power of the act of consciousness, nor without the mediation of this consciousness's rationality—a further synthesizing act within consciousness—even when the deed contradicts reason. "Hence," says Blondel, "it is because we find in our acts a kind of creative sovereignty that we have a consciousness of ourselves and reason; it is because we are reasonable and conscious of ourselves that we judge ourselves capable of voluntary initiative."2 The paradox, at one angle, is this leap or gap, this difference nevertheless sustained by a mediation, where ideas and deeds are non-identical yet inseparable. At another angle, it is a paradox that a "science of practice" has to straddle, since it studies (as science) what it is not: concrete action (practice). Blondel, whether young or of his latter days, is after the possibility of such a science. He is also after the bond between reasoning and acting. In this section, I also seek that bond, and I make use of Blondel's early and later works together to give a sense not of Blondel's development, but of the Gestalt of his life's work with respect to the bond between thought and action.3The bond first requires the rejection of monism. Though Blondel's stance toward theologies of his day tends to be more well-known among theologians, and therefore filtered through questions of nature and grace and carried through to a rejection of a two-tiered conception of the universe, still, his nearer interlocutors are often monists: modern philosophers and the modern sciences, and their strange compatriots in history, the spiritual movements of the fin de siècle, involving spiritualisms of various kinds, recollected in our popular imagination today in visions of crystal balls and séance tables. The positivism of the modern sciences and of modern (French) philosophy poses a totally self-contained "nature" that can be explained [End Page 1306] without religion, in a form of what English speakers might call "secularism," but which is more accurately filtered through French Republican desires for laïcité.4 While Blondel was writing, there were not only these political and scientific and philosophical trends, but also the semi-pantheistic, variously agnostic religious movements that dominated privileged circles in Europe at the time. These are a kind of... (shrink)

Introduction, by H. J. Cargas.--St. Paul and Teilhard de Chardin, by J. H. Adams.--Teilhard and Dante, by M. Gable.--Tennyson and Teilhard, by E. R. August.--Teilhard, neo-Marxism, existentialism, by M. Barthelemy-Madaule.--Whitman, Teilhard, and Jung, by R. Benoit.--C. G. Jung and Teilhard de Chardin, by N. Braybrooke.--Camus and Teilhard, by P. Rosazza.--Bonhoeffer and Teilhard, by C. M. Hegarty.--Voices of convergence: Teilhard, McLuhan, and Brown, by D. J. Leary.

Much has been made of the so-called “speculative turn” in contemporary philosophy. For some, this turn marks the “end of phenomenology” and the dawn of a new empiricism in European philosophy. For others, it amounts to nothing more than a renewal of the straw-person accusation of psychologism against phenomenology. In truth, it is neither. Instead, this article argues that while at times mutually critical of one another, speculative materialism and phenomenology are best understood as parallel projects with shared trajectories and (...) aims, common concerns, and even comparable methods. The bene????it of reading these two apparently divergent camps as parallel projects is that it allows phenomenology to understand the diversity of its own history anew and, in light of this, to draw from speculative realism as a resource for rethinking its objectives and methods in its pursuit of a robust post-Kantian realism. (shrink)

In the context of business, interactions between individuals generate social systems that emerge anywhere within a corporation or in its relations with external agents. These systems influence the behaviors of individuals and, as a result, the collective actions we usually attribute to corporations. Social systems thus make a difference in processes of action that are often morally evaluated by internal and external agents to the firm. Despite this relevance, social systems have not yet been the object of specific attention in (...) the literature on moral agency in business. To fill this gap, I construct a theoretical framework based on Luhmann’s ideas on social systems and morality. In particular, I argue that morality is a phenomenon that occurs in communication, and an agent can engage in morality in three different ways (as a _moral factor_, an _expressive moral agent_, or a _reflective moral agent_) depending on the functions it plays in communicative interactions. Based on this framework, I argue that social systems in business can be considered moral agents of those types. (shrink)

Emily Carroll and Parker Crutchfield propose a new inconsistency argument against abortion restrictivism. In response, I raised several objections to their argument. Recently Carroll and Crutchfield have replied and seem to be under the impression that I’m a restrictivist. This is puzzling, since my criticism of their view included a very thinly veiled, but purposely more charitable, anti-restrictivist inconsistency argument. In this response, I explain how Carroll and Crutchfield mischaracterize my position and that of the restrictivist.

We present a conjecture in Diophantine geometry concerning the construction of line bundles over smooth projective varieties over ${\overline {\mathbb {Q}}}$. This conjecture, closely related to the Grothendieck period conjecture for cycles of codimension $1$, is also motivated by classical algebraization results in analytic and formal geometry and in transcendence theory. Its formulation involves the consideration of $D$-group schemes attached to abelian schemes over algebraic curves over ${\overline {\mathbb {Q}}}$. We also derive the Grothendieck period conjecture for cycles of codimension (...) $1$ in abelian varieties over ${\overline {\mathbb {Q}}}$ from a classical transcendence theorem à la Schneider–Lang. (shrink)

Tüm dünyayı etkisi altına alan koronavirüs pandemisinin siyasi tutumlarla ilişkisini öğrenmek ve siyasetin kriz durumlarında halkın tutum ve davranışlarını yönlendirip yönlendirmediğini öğrenmek amacıyla 767 kişiyle çevrimiçi anket yapılmıştır. Yapılan nicel araştırma sonucunda, alınan önleyici tedbirlere uymanın, bu tedbirlerin yerinde oluşuna/haklılığına olan tutumun, aşı olma niyetinin ve aşının koruyuculuğuna olan inancın siyasi görüşlere göre farklılaştığı bulunmuştur. Ayrıca katılımcıların yapılan Covid-19 açıklamaları bakımından siyasi partilerine, parti temsilcilerinden daha çok güvendikleri, alınan önlem ve tedbirleri kısmen yerinde/haklı buldukları ve çok büyük çoğunluğun bu önlemlere (...) uyduğu görülmüştür. Araştırma sonucunda virüsün kökenine yönelik inançlar bakımından virüsün gerçek olduğuna inanıldığı, ortaya çıkış nedeni bakımından ise ülkelerin ekonomilerini kötüleştirmek ve dünya nüfusunu azaltmak için ortaya çıktığına inanıldığı görülmüştür. Araştırmadan çıkan bir başka sonuç ise katılımcıların televizyon, dergi ve gazetelerin ideolojik nedenlerle ve siyasi yanlılıklarına bağlı olarak virüs haberlerini halka farklı yansıttığını düşündükleridir. Sosyal medyadaki haberlerin ise yanıltıcı, yanlış olduğu görüşündelerdir. Bu çalışma sonucunda salgın hastalık, afet, savaş, ekonomik krizler gibi olağanüstü durumlarda siyasetin, siyasi görüşlerin dikkate alınmasının hem krizin üstesinden gelmede hem de toplumun tüm üyelerini kapsamada önemli bir rol oynayacağı vurgulanmaktadır. (shrink)

This article tries to unravel some of the main clues provided by Ortega on his understanding of philosophy. The thesis we defend is that the Spanish philosopher maintains two slightly different answers concerning the question what is philosophy, though Ortega does not acknowledge them in the explicit narrative of his thinking. This, we believe, creates tensions in his late second philosophical model, as he does not fully break away from certain “adherence” or “mannerisms” associated to his early model. In this (...) respect, Ortega would be a thinker who lives between two philosophical worlds, someone who sees, narrates and interprets the philosophical shock wave occurring at his time, but does not quite let go of the old intellectual constructions. To support our thesis, we will compare two texts, his 1929 lectures What is Philosophy?, and his Notes on Thinking, from 1941. In the period between these two works, Ortega seems to move from a more “traditional,” “universalistic,” “transcendental,” in short, Husserlian phenomenological understanding of philosophy, to a more historicist, hermeneutical, and pragmatic one, which lays the emphasis on the plurality of discourses on the sense, the contingency of the philosophical narrative itself, and even the very possibility of its ending, at least in its more “metaphysical” and classical form. (shrink)

The New Testament presents Jesus as a transformational leader whose ministry had a holistic approach to challenges that were prevalent in his contemporary world. This article is a theological reflection of the role of the church in the public space in Zimbabwe as we draw lessons from servant leadership which is derived from Johannine Jesus’ message in John 21:15–18 with special focus on the Zimbabwean socio-political context (2017–2023). It is imperative for the Zimbabwean church to draw lessons from the socio-historical (...) interpretation of Johannine Jesus’ message in John 21:15–18 because the Bible has to speak to our context in the here and now. The article concludes that the Zimbabwean church is compromised because of divisions among ecumenical Christian organisations on how to deal with socio-political issues in Zimbabwe such that an effective application of Jesus’ political ethics is problematic. The article recommends that church should be more proactive by empowering her members and the community at large on how Jesus’ ethics on servant leadership are useful in socio-political context in Zimbabwe. This will help the church to remain relevant and transformative in the public space. Contribution: The article contributes towards the scope of the special collection on the contextual reading of New Testament in the socio-political landscape in Zimbabwe as it focuses on the lessons drawn from the socio-historical interpretation of the Johannine Jesus’ message in John 21:15–18 towards the role of the church in the public space in Zimbabwe. (shrink)

Arrivé à un stade de ma vie qui m'engage à prendre du recul, je voudrais témoigner dans ce livre d'un certain sentiment de spiritualité, qui a émergé de mes recherches pour comprendre l'ordre caché des choses et le sens secret de la nature. Ce sentiment est né d'un émerveillement et d'une révélation sur la simplicité des codes naturels qui conduisent au jaillissement, dans l'espace et dans le temps, de formes d'une extrême diversité et d'une grande beauté. Une morphogenèse qui a (...) passionné des penseurs comme Pythagore, Benoît Mandelbrot ou Alan Turing, et qui se poursuit par le travail et l'oeuvre des hommes. Ce travail est désormais mis en cause par les extensions du corps et du cerveau humains que représentent l'intelligence artificielle et les robots... Aujourd'hui, il devient plus difficile de prédire les évolutions exponentielles auxquelles nous sommes confrontés dans les domaines scientifique, technologique, économique et politique. Mon message vise à alerter les prospectivistes, les politiques, les économistes, les scientifiques, non seulement sur la vitesse de ces évolutions, mais surtout sur les interdépendances émergentes entre intelligence artificielle, robotique, travail humain et modifications de l'" ADN " d'Internet. Mal comprises, ces évolutions peuvent engendrer des mouvements tels que le transhumanisme. Mieux intégrées à nos réflexions, elles peuvent en revanche mener à une nouvelle étape de l'évolution de l'humanité... (shrink)

In his commentary on Aristotle’s De intepretatione, Ammonius criticises the view, which he ascribes to Alexander of Aphrodisias, that epirrhêmata, ‘adverbs’, fall under the rubric of onoma. While it is difficult to establish Alexander’s view on the basis of Ammonius’s criticism, I argue that an intelligible view can be reconstructed, mainly based on evidence in Alexander’s commentary on the Topics, about different types of adverbs. In particular, I suggest that Alexander, apparently unlike Ammonius, may have drawn a distinction between two (...) classes of adverbs Aristotle deals with in his logical writings: tropoi (modal operators); and ptôseis, i.e. the specific type of ‘inflections’ (adverbs in -ôs derived from a noun – usually an abstract noun) playing a prominent role in several of the topoi Aristotle gives in the Topics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Entanglement: How Art and Philosophy Make Us What We Are by Alva NoëFrederik M. Bjerregaard-NielsenNOË, Alva. The Entanglement: How Art and Philosophy Make Us What We Are. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2023. 288 pp. Cloth, $27.95In The Entanglement, Alva Noë sets forth a minimal yet meaningful definition of art and philosophy and asks how they make us what we are. Art and philosophy are the modes (...) of practice that disrupt and disorganize our habitual ways of doing things, everything from dancing to language, to philosophy and art themselves. They are the reflection at a distance of what we do. “In this sense, then, art is disruptive. Always: everywhere.” From this basis, he tackles a wide range of phenomena from dancing, seeing, writing, and so forth, to introduce a distinction between these as everyday phenomena and their function as art. This delimitation is not material, nor intrinsic to any of the analyzed phenomena; rather, it depends on each practice’s ability to disrupt, disorganize, and force upon us the question of what dancing, seeing, writing is at all. Noë provides an example: At an art exhibition one is confronted with a painting that is ungraspable, foreign, meaningless. But, through a mediation (pointers from a friend, new knowledge of the era, analyses of the style, and so forth) the painting starts becoming significant; it starts to make sense. The viewer is stopped in her tracks, and a painting that was before closed is now opened up to a new perception, a new way of seeing.But Noë extends this aesthetic domain to experience and perception. In perception, we are actively engaged in achieving the things around us, achieving the world. And, in art, this habitual way of attainment is obstructed, for art presents us with new ways of seeing, listening, feeling, and so forth. Noë thus challenges common (especially neuro-aesthetic) views on perception and experience in favor of a more phenomenological approach by which he accentuates the active engagement in the world by which perception and experience come about. And this aesthetic domain, broadly understood, is the locus of showing how we, through these disruptive practices, create new ways of doing, perceiving, understanding, and, even further, create ourselves. We “all operate in a space of significance held open by art.” In other words, it is through a reassessment of the aesthetic that Noë shows how art and philosophy make us what we are. For what we are, for Noë, is this ability of disruption, development, and creation of ourselves. This is what makes us human. Human nature is therefore essentially cultural, a disruption of habit and new avenues of development, but one that is rooted in our body as a horizon of possibilities. Even though he does not conclude on this phylogenetic question, Noë does seem to suggest that the species’s ability to generate art (exemplified by early cave paintings) and philosophy are foundational [End Page 724] to its development or, more strongly, necessary to it being what it is. He thus proposes an alternative to the traditional schism of the nature/nurture and natural/cultural debate, which takes this wide view of aesthetics as its central term.One might raise the question whether the text would have benefited from more thorough analyses of the thinkers who are at play, sometimes at the margin, sometimes at the foundation of the disruption Noë’s text attempts, notably: Merleau-Ponty, with his extensive analyses of habit and style and their place in our life engaging behavior; Derrida’s deconstruction of phonocentrism, which attacks written language’s subordination to the spoken and asks the fundamental question of the ontology of language as such; or perhaps most present by its absence, Nietzsche’s grandiose thought of the human being and life itself as an aesthetic phenomenon. For Nietzsche thereby incorporated both ontology and critique in the sphere of aesthetics in his revaluation of all values. This, quite like Noë, allowed Nietzsche to set forth the human being as a creature of its own creation. These authors are given brief treatments, relegated to footnotes, or left out entirely.But such a critique might be too... (shrink)